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46 Ill.2d 330, 263 N.E.2d 11

Supreme Court of Illinois.
Elizabeth Nitze PAEPCKE et al., Appellants,
CHICAGO et al., Appellees.

No. 43240.

Sept. 29, 1970.

Citizens, residents, taxpayers and property owners
of Chicago brought action to prevent Public Building
Commission, the City of Chicago, Board of
Education, and Chicago Park District from implementing
plans to construct school and recreational
facilities in two parks. The Circuit Court, Cook
County, Walter P. Dahl, J., dismissed complaint
and plaintiff appealed. The Supreme Court, Burt, J.,
held that owners of property adjacent to or in vicinity
of city parks dedicated by statute did not have
private property right to continuation of park use,
and that statutes, including Public Building Commission
Act, authorized diversion of portion of land
dedicated to park purposes for use for school construction.


Calvin Sawyier and Richard L. Wexler,
Chicago, for appellants.

Richard L. Curry, Corporation Counsel, Chicago,
for appellee City of Chicago.

William R. Dillon, Chicago, for appellee Public
Building Commission of Chicago.

James W. Coffey and John T. Mehigan, Chicago,
for appellee Board of Education of City of Chicago.

Neil F. Hartigan and Harry R. Posner, Chicago, for
appellee Chicago Park Dist.

George E. Bullwinkel and Richard Stillerman,
Chicago (George W. Overton and Marshall Patner,
Chicago, of counsel), amici curiae.

BURT, Justice.

Plaintiffs, who are citizens, residents, taxpayers and
property owners of the city of Chicago appeal from
an order of the circuit court of Cook County dismissing
their complaint by which they sought to
prevent defendants, Public Building Commission of
Chicago, the City of Chicago, the Board of Education
of Chicago and the Chicago *332 Park District
from implementing plans to construct school and
recreational facilities in Washington and Douglas
parks. This court has jurisdiction on direct appeal
because of the constitutional questions involved.

The facts are to be gathered from statements in the
complaint which are admitted by defendants' motion
to dismiss and from joint exhibits admitted into
evidence at the request of all of the parties. In 1869
the General Assembly passed 'An Act to Provide
for the Location and Maintenance of a Park for the
Towns of South Chicago, Hyde Park and Lake'
which was approved and in force February 24,
1869. (Private Laws, 1869, vol. 1, p. 358.) The statute
provided that five persons, to be appointed by
the Governor, be constituted a board of public park
commissioners for the towns in question to be
known as the 'South Park Commissioners'. The act
authorized the commissioners to select certain lands
which are specifically described by metes and
bounds and provided in section 4 thereof that the
lands 'when acquired by said Commissioners, as
provided by this act, shall be held, managed and
controlled by them and their successors, as a public
park, for the recreation, health and benefit of the
public, and free to all persons forever.' Pursuant to
the granted authority the commissioners proceeded
to acquire, among other lands, those which
presently constitute Washington Park which is now
held by the Chicago Park District as successor to
the South Park Commissioners. The deeds by which
the property was originally acquired by the commissioners
purport to convey an unrestricted title in
fee simple without mention of park usage.
Washington Park as presently constituted contains
371 acres. It is located on the south side of the city
of Chicago and is bounded by 51st Street on the
north, Cottage Grove Avenue on the east, 60th
Street on the south and Martin Luther King Drive
on the west.

In 1869, the same year in which the South Park
Commission was created, the General Assembly
passed an act entitled 'An Act to amend the
charter of the city of Chicago, to create a board of
Park Commissioners, and authorize a tax in the
town of West Chicago, and for other purposes', approved
and in force February 27, 1869. (Private
Laws of 1869, vol. 1, p. 342.) By this legislation a
board of public park commissioners to be known as
'The West Chicago Park Commissioners' was created
with power and authority to acquire certain
designated lands with the stipulation in section 5
thereof 'that said board shall have power, and it is
made their duty and they are hereby authorized to
select and take possession of, and to acquire by
condemnation, contract, donation or otherwise, title
forever in trust for the inhabitants, and for the public,
as public promenade and pleasure grounds and
ways.' After their appointment by the Governor the
commissioners acquired, among other lands, those
which now constitute Douglas Park, presently held
by the Chicago Park District as successor to the
West Chicago Park Commissioners. This park, consisting
of 181.99 acres is situated on the west side
of the city of Chicago bounded on the north by
Roosevelt Road, on the east by California Avenue,
on the south by 19th Street and on the west by Albany
Avenue. The land comprising this park was
acquired by 10 deeds, six originals and two reconstructions
of which were received in evidence. The
remaining deeds were not found in the records of
the recorder due to the Chicago fire. Each of the six
originals admitted was on the same printed deed
form and contained the same restrictive language as
that found in section 5 of the act as above quoted.
In two of these the restrictive language had been
crossed out. In the remaining four it had been unaltered.
No restrictions appear in the reconstructed

The Public Building Commission of Chicago, at the
request of the Board of Education of the City of
Chicago has undertaken a program involving the
construction, alteration, repair, renovation and rehabilitation
of public schools in the city, together
with park, recreational playground and other
related public facilities which will be leased by the
Building Commission to the Board of Education,
the Chicago Park District and other governmental
agencies. The commission has selected, located and
designated sites within the territorial limits of the
city of Chicago as sites to be acquired for the erection
and construction of elementary, middle and
high schools to serve about 30,000 pupils, together
with park, recreational and playground facilities.
Each of the sites has been recommended by the Department
of Development and Planning of the City
of Chicago in accord with the comprehensive plan
for the city of Chicago and in cooperation with the
Board of Education of the City of Chicago and also
the Chicago Park District in connection with the
sites in which the Chicago Park District is involved.
Some of these sites have already been approved by
the city council of the city of Chicago.

A site has been designated in Washington Park for
the erection of a school-park facility. The Chicago
Park District proposes to convey to the Public
Building Commission of Chicago for such purposes
a total of 3.839 acres located in the northwest portion
of the park about 250 feet from the northern
boundary. On 2.586 acres of this site the building
commission proposes to construct a middle school
for approximately 1500 students to be leased to the
Board of Education of the City of Chicago. The remaining
1.253 acres would be utilized in the construction
of a gymnasium and recreational facilities
which will be leased to the Chicago Park District.
Construction had started on this site at the
time suit was filed but had not proceeded to a point
where original use of the land would no longer be
possible. Of the sites thus far selected by the Public
Building Commission of Chicago and approved by
the city council of the city of Chicago only the 2.6
acres in Washington Park involves property in a
park which is to be used for school construction.
No site has been designated in Douglas Park
but one is under consideration at the present time.

Plaintiffs' complaint alleges a class action brought
on behalf of three classes of citizens: (1) those
named who are citizens, residents and taxpayers of
the city of Chicago; (2) those named who are citizens,
taxpayers and residents of areas of the city
served by a large regional city park such as Washington
Park and (3) those named who are citizens,
taxpayers and residents of an area served by a large
regional city park, such as Washington Park, and
who own real property bordering on or in the immediate
vicinity of said park in respect to which
there is a plan to construct a schoolhouse within the
boundaries of such park. It is plaintiffs' theory that
the parks in question are so dedicated that they are
held in public trust for use only as park or recreational
grounds and that those of them who are
property owners adjacent to or in the vicinity of a
park dedicated by the acts of 1869 have a private
property right to the continuation of the park use of

which even the legislature cannot deprive them.
They further contend that all plaintiffs who are citizens
and residents of any area of the city have a
public property right to enforce the public trust existing
by reason of the dedication of the parks as
aforesaid and to require that no change of park use
be permitted because the legislature has not explicitly
and openly so provided by statute. Additionally,
plaintiffs contend that the Public Building
Commission Act does not authorize construction by
the commission of local school houses in Chicago's
regional parks under the plan proposed by defendants
and that controlling statutes make this scheme
invalid for both the Board of Education and the
Chicago Park District. Finally, it is alleged that the
Public Building Commission Act is unconstitutional
as being too vague and indefinite.

In sustaining defendants' motion to dismiss the
complaint the trial court, in its judgment order, rejected
all of plaintiffs' contentions and specifically
found that plaintiffs in each of the three classifications
asserted had no such interest in Washington
Park or Douglas Park sufficient to enable or
entitle them, or any of them, to maintain the action
'except as taxpayers.'

We think it is clear from the undisputed facts
in this case that there has been a dedication by the
General Assembly of the lands in question for use
as public parks. This is so notwithstanding the fact
that the deeds by which the South Park Commissioners
and the West Chicago Park Commissioners
obtained title did or did not contain any of the restrictive
language found in the legislative enactments.
The authority of the Commissioners in
either case to receive title existed solely by virtue
of the provisions of the statutes which created the
respective municipal bodies for the sole purpose of
acquiring the lands for the purposes specified. Both
acts in substance specified that the lands when acquired
should be devoted to park purposes though
the language was not the same in each case. Such a
dedication having been made by the sovereign, the
agencies created by it hold the properties in trust
for the uses and purposes specified and for the benefit
of the public. See: Illinois Central Railroad
Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 13 S.Ct. 110, 36 L.Ed.
1018; Bliss v. Ward, 198 Ill. 104, 115, 64 N.E. 705;
Sax, 'The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource
Law: Effective Judicial Intervention,' 68
Mich.Law Rev. 471--566.

In his extensive discussion of the 'public trust
doctrine' in the article just cited, the author, Professor
Joseph L. Sax, had occasion, at pps.
489--491, to analyze the decision in Illinois Central
Railroad Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 13 S.Ct. 110,
36 L.Ed. 1018, which he refers to as 'The Lodestar
of American Public Trust Law'. According to this
authority the central substantive thought in public
trust litigation as derived from this case is: 'When a
state holds a resource which is available for the free
use of the general public, a court will look with
considerable skepticism upon any governmental
conduct which is calculated either to reallocate that
resource to more restricted uses or to subject public
uses to the self interest of private parties'.
However, in discussing the question whether the
government can or should be viewed as having
made any irrevocable commitments about the use
of particular governmental resources, i.e. whether
any formal governmental acts can accomplish the
result of changing or abolishing the use (and observing
that the question had apparently never been
adjudicated with respect to national parks) the author
says, at p. 482: 'To accept such claims of property
rights would be to prohibit the government
from ever accommodating new public needs by
reallocating resources. Certainly any such notion
strikes at the very essence of governmental power,
and acceptance of such a theory by a court would
be as unwise as it is unlikely. It is important to recognize
that the assertion of a taking is not a mere
claim to compensation, for the objectors do not
want cash; rather it is a claim that when a resource
is dedicated to public use, that dedication is irrevocable.
However strongly one might feel about the
present imbalance in resource allocation it hardly
seems sensible to ask for a freezing of any future
configuration of policy judgments, for that result
would seriously hamper the government's attempts
to cope with the problems caused by changes in the
needs and desires of the citizenry'. Finally, in
discussing the state of the authorities on the question,
the author says at pp. 485--486: 'One who searches
through the reported cases will find many general
statements which seem to imply that a government
may never alienate trust property by conveying it to
a private owner and that it may not effect changes
in the use to which that property has been devoted'.
Then, after examining quotes from two cases, the
author continues, 'But a careful examination of the
cases will show that the excerpts just quoted and almost
all other such statements are dicta and do not
determine the limits of the state's legitimate authority
in dealing with trust lands. Unfortunately, the
case law has not developed in any way that permits
confident assertions about the outer limits of state 
power. Nonetheless, by examining the diverse
and often loosely written opinions dealing with
public lands, one may obtain a reasonably good picture
of judicial attitudes'.

With this much of background we approach
the first question presented in this appeal: Have
plaintiffs who are property owners adjacent to or in
the vicinity of the parks dedicated by the acts of
1869 a private property right to continuation of the
park use of which even the legislature cannot deprive
them? This question must be answered in the
negative. The mere dedication by the sovereign of
lands to public park uses does not give property
owners adjoining or in the vicinity of the park the
right to have the use continue unchanged even
though, when the park was established, abutting or
adjoining owners were assessed for special benefits
conferred. (Reichelderfer v. Quinn, 287 U.S. 315,
53 S.Ct. 177, 77 L.Ed. 331.) In the cited case Rock
Creek Park in the District of Columbia had been
created by act of Congress providing that the lands
'were perpetually dedicated and set apart as a public
park or pleasure ground for the benefit and enjoyment
of the people of the United States'. A later act
of Congress authorized the Commissioners of the
District of Columbia to construct a fire engine
house in the park. The Supreme Court held
that the plaintiffs derived no rights against the government
and had no interests protected by the constitution
against diminution by the government,
however unreasonable its action might be. Also, as
far as the private rights of adjoining owners are
concerned, see: Thayer v. City of Boston, D.C., 206
F. 969 (schoolhouse in park); Fielding v. Board of
Education of Paterson, 76 N.J.Super. 50, 183 A.2d
767 (schoolhouse in park); Carlson v. City of Fremont,
180 Neb. 262, 142 N.W.2d 157 (fire station
in park); Stevens v. Mayor and Council of City of
Vinita (Okl.1957), 315 P.2d 776 (fire station in
park). As to rights of adjoining owners in lands devoted
to public uses generally see: Horn v. City of
Chicago, 403 Ill. 549, 87 N.E.2d 642; *339Doane
v. Lake Street Elevated Railroad Co., 165 Ill. 510,
46 N.E. 520; Stetson v. Chicago and Evanston Railroad
Co., 75 Ill. 74.

In asserting a private property right plaintiffs cite
South Park Commissioners v. Montgomery
Ward & Co., 248 Ill. 299, 93 N.E. 910; City of
Jacksonville v. Jacksonville Railway Co., 67 Ill.
540 and Nichols v. City of Rock Island, 3 Ill.2d
531, 121 N.E.2d 799. None of these cases fairly
supports plaintiffs' contention.

South Park Commissioners v. Montgomery
Ward & Co. is the last of a long line of cases
wherein the owners of property on the west side of
Michigan Avenue in the city of Chicago were able
to prevent the construction of buildings in Lake
Front Park (later Grant Park). A reference to some
of the earlier cases, especially City of Chicago v.
Ward, 169 Ill. 392, 397--398, 48 N.E. 927, shows
that the legislature, by act creating the city of
Chicago, provided that no encroachments should be
made on any land or water west of a line 400 feet
east from the west line of Michigan Avenue and
parallel thereto, and that any person being an owner
of any lot fronting on Michigan Avenue should
have the right to enjoin the company (the railroad)
and all other persons and corporations from violations
of the section of the statute in question and in
his or their own name or otherwise enforce the provisions
of said ordinance (which defined railroad's
rights) and this section and recover damages Etc.
There were to be no encroachments without consent
of all owners. It thus appears that the adjoining
owners in these cases had a 'built in' cause of action
and special property rights given by statute. In
South Park Commissioners v. Montgomery
Ward & Co., the holding is that the interests held
by these adjoining owners could not be condemned
because it would amount to a taking of private
property for an illegal use. In this case there is no
showing that plaintiffs have any special property
rights or interests by contract or otherwise. On the
contrary the allegation is only that they own property
adjacent to or in the vicinity of the parks. The
South Park Commissioners case is therefore
clearly distinguishable. In the Jacksonville
case no question was raised or passed upon relative
to the private rights of property owners abutting on
the square or park. The action was brought by the
city to restrain the railroad from extending its trackage
through the square, and the holding is that the
legislature had no right to give the railroad rights
which were contrary to the terms of dedication by
the original grantors. This court held that the injunction
requested by the city should have been issued.
Any statement or inference that the abutting
owners had special property rights in pure Dictum.
As to the Nichols case, no legislative action is involved
and therefore no issue is presented as to
abutting owners being deprived of their property
rights by legislative action. It further appears that
plaintiffs claimed a perpetual easement by way of a
special property right. As already indicated, no
such claim is made here. This court decided in the
Nichols case that the construction of a swimming
pool, bath house and parking lot in the park in
question was consistent with the public uses intended.

The second question is whether all of plaintiffs, including
citizens who are residents of any area
of the city, have a public property right to enforce
the public trust here and to require that no change
of park use be permitted because the legislature has
not explicitly and openly so provided by statute. If
we understand plaintiffs' position correctly they do
not contend, as far as the rights of the public in
public trust lands are concerned, that the legislature
could never, by appropriate action, change or reallocate
the use in any way. (This would be contrary
to well established precedent. See: Droste v. Kerner,
34 Ill.2d 495, 217 N.E.2d 73; People ex rel. Moloney
v. Kirk, 162 Ill. 138, 45 N.E. 830; People exrel.
Bransom v. Walsh, 96 Ill. 232, 250.) Plaintiffs
argue, rather, that before such change can be said to
have taken place there must be explicit and open
action by the legislature authorizing such a diversion.

As to the first part of the question, i.e., the interests
of plaintiffs and their standing to bring
the action, the trial judge found that they had no
rights sufficient to enable them to maintain the action
'except as taxpayers'. In Droste v. Kerner, 34
Ill.2d 495, 504, 217 N.E.2d 73, this court held that
an individual taxpayer or property owner, in the absence
of statutory authority conferring that right,
had no standing in equity to enjoin an alleged misuse
of property held in trust for the public unless he
alleges and proves that he will suffer special damage,
different in degree and kind from that suffered
by the public at large. There was a dissent in the
Droste case in which it was pointed out that the alleged
cause of action in such cases is based upon
the individual's status as a taxpayer and that it is his
equitable interest, as a taxpayer, in the public property
which he claims is being illegally disposed of
that determines has standing to maintain the action;
that his right to sue does not depend on any injury
to his property and that he should not be forced to
rely solely upon the efforts of public law officers
for the protection of public rights. Authorities were
cited to support this position and distinctions were
observed as to the authorities relied upon by the
majority. Upon serious reconsideration of this question
we now believe that portion of the opinion in
Droste dealing with the right and standing of the
plaintiff to sue should be overruled, as should any
other former decisions of this court holding that a
citizen and taxpayer has no right, in the absence of
statute, to bring an action to enforce the trust upon
which public property is held unless he is able to allege
and prove special damage to his property. If
the 'public trust' doctrine is to have any meaning or
vitality at all, the members of the public, at least
taxpayers who are the beneficiaries of that trust,
must have the right and standing to enforce it. To
tell them that they must wait upon governmental
action is often an effectual denial of the right for all
time. The conclusion we have reached is in accord
with decisions in other jurisdictions, see: E.g.
Robbins v. Department of Public Works, 355
Mass. 328, 244 N.E.2d 577, and Gould v. Greylock
Reservation Com., 350 Mass. 410, 215 N.E.2d 114,
wherein plaintiffs' rights as residents in a trust of
public lands were enforced without question.

As to the second part of the question, I.e., whether
there has been a sufficient manifestation of legislative
intent to permit the diversion and reallocation
contemplated by the plan proposed by defendants,
it should be remembered that in People ex rel.
Stamos v. Public Building Com., 40 Ill.2d 164, 238
N.E.2d 390, this court had before it the very plan
and program here involved which was examined in
detail in the light of the many constitutional objections
raised. Our conclusion was that the plan was
valid and not subject to any of the objections urged.
The only question of major importance not before
us in Stamos which is present here is that of alleged
illegal diversion of use which plaintiffs claim is
without statutory authority. In our opinion in
Stamos we examined with some care the provisions
of the original Public Building Commission Act of
1955 (Ill.Rev.Stat.1955, ch. 34, pars. 256--
ACT as amended in 1965 (Ill.rev.stat.1967, ch. 85,
pars. 1031--1054) particularly sections 3 and 14(c)
(pars. 1033 and 1044); the 1955 amendment to the
School Code (Ill.Rev.Stat.1955, ch. 122, par.
34--20a, now par. 34--21.1); the 1957 amendment
to the School Code (Ill.Rev.Stat.1957, ch. 122, par.
15--22) and the 1955 amendment to the Park District
Act (Ill.Rev.Stat.1955, ch. 105, par. 333.15a)
and concluded that these statutes evidenced an intention
on the part of the General Assembly to authorize
the improvement of the site there in question
with a complex of school, park and recreational
facilities for the full utilization of such property for
the benefit of the school children during the school
terms and hours, and for the general public at other
periods. In other words, we found that the applicable
statutes authorized the program of schools and
recreational facilities in parks which is now sought
to be implemented in Washington and possibly
in Douglas Park by the defendant here.

Plaintiffs argue nevertheless that before defendants
can be allowed to carry out their plan the legislature
must clearly and specifically state with reference
to the park or parks in question explicit authority
to divert to new public uses and that there
must appear in that legislation not only a statement
of the new use but a statement or recital showing in
some way an awareness on the part of the legislature
of the existing public use. Their position is
based mainly upon a line of Massachusetts cases including
Robbins v. Department of Public Works,
355 Mass. 328, 244 N.E.2d 577; Gould v. Greylock
Reservation Commission, 350 Mass. 410, 215
N.E.2d 114; and Commonwealth v. Massachusetts
Turnpike Authority, 346 Mass. 250, 191 N.E.2d
481. It is our conclusion, as we found in the Stamos
case, that present statutes, including the Public
Building Commission Act, authorize a plan such as
that evolved for Washington Park presently, and we
further find that the intention expressed in that legislation
is sufficiently broad, comprehensive and
definite to allow the diversion in use involved here.
In passing we think it appropriate to refer to the approach
developed by the courts of our sister State,
Wisconsin, in dealing with diversion problems. In
at least two cases, City of Madison v. State, 1
Wis.2d 252, 83 N.W.2d 674; and State v. Public
Service Com., 275 Wis. 112, 81 N.W.2d 71, the Supreme
Court of Wisconsin approved proposed diversions
in the use of public trust lands under conditions
which demonstrated (1) that public bodies
would control use of the area in question, (2) that
the area would be devoted to public purposes and
open to the public, (3) the diminution of the area of
original use would be small compared with the entire
area, (4) that none of the public uses of the original
area would be destroyed or greatly impaired
and (5) that the disappointment of those wanting to
use the area of new use for former purposes was
negligible when compared to the greater convenience
to be afforded those members of the public
using the new facility. We believe that the
present plans for Washington Park meet all of these
tests. While not controlling under the issues as
presented in this case we believe that standards
such as these might serve as a useful guide for future
administrative action.

We believe that most of the remaining
questions raised by plaintiffs have been dealt with
and decided, either directly or by necessary inference,
in our opinion in the Stamos case but we shall
endeavor to cover all of them as briefly as possible.
First, it is contended here as it was in Stamos that
the Board of Education of the City of Chicago is
not authorized to lease schoolhouse space from the
Building Commission. We refer to p. 182 of our
former opinion, 238 N.E.2d 390 in answer to this
argument. We adhere to our former position for the
reasons there given. We have considered the authorities
cited by plaintiffs and find that they are
not productive of a contrary result. Second, it is
said that the Chicago Park District cannot
lease land from the Building Commission for any
purposes except those related to its administrative
functions. This argument was likewise made in
Stamos and there answered at pps. 185--186, 238
N.E.2d 390. We adhere to our position as stated
therein. Third, it is claimed that the Chicago Park
District cannot donate cash or land and the Chicago
Board of Education cannot donate cash to the Public
Building Commission for the construction of a
building and auxiliary facilities which neither is authorized
to lease. It will be noted that this contention
is based on the assumption that neither the
board nor district can lease. Since, as decided
above, both are authorized to lease, there is no basis
for this contention. Further, it was specifically decided
in Stamos, 40 Ill.2d p. 186, 238 N.E.2d 390,
that the Chicago Park District was authorized to
contribute property for the purposes specified. We
adhere to that decision. The power to donate under
section 13 of the Public Building Commission Act,
(Ill.Rev.Stat.1967, ch. 85, par. 1043), is broad. That
section confers power to donate property or
cash on municipal corporations 'which may be desirous
of renting space in any building or buildings
to be acquired or constructed by such Public Buildings
Commission * * * in such amount or amounts
as they may deem proper and appropriate in aiding
the Public Building Commission to effectuate the
purpose for its creation'. Fourth, plaintiffs say that
the twenty-year obligations for rental payments and
for payments for maintenance and operation which
defendants' scheme contemplates will be undertaken
by the Chicago Board of Education and the
Chicago Park District in violation of their annual
appropriation requirements and their respective tax
limits. This entire argument is met and answered at
pps. 183--185, 238 N.E.2d 390 in our opinion in
Stomas. We re-adopt that language and reasoning.

Finally, plaintiffs challenge the Public Building
Commission Act on the ground that it is vague
and indefinite and therefore unconstitutional. The
first part of their argument concerns the phrase 'essential
governmental, health, safety and welfare
services' in section 14(c). It is said that it is impossible
to determine the scope of such services.
This argument was considered specifically in
Stamos at pps. 174--177, 238 N.E.2d 390, 396 and
the conclusion was that the legislative standards
contained in the Public Building Commission Act
are more than sufficient to satisfy the requirements
of the due-process clauses of the State and Federal
constitutions and article III of the Illinois constitution,
S.H.A. We also had occasion in Stamos to observe
(p. 176, 238 N.E.2d 390) that this court had
used the precise word 'essential' in sustaining the
constitutionality of the original Public Building
Commission Act in People ex rel. Adamowski v.
Public Building Com., 11 Ill.2d 125 at 131, 142
N.E.2d 67.

Plaintiffs' second contention as to vagueness
comes in connection with section 14(i). That section
authorizes a public building commission to
'rent such space in such building or buildings as
from time to time may not be needed by any
governmental agency for such other purposes as the
Board of Commissioners may determine will best
serve the comfort and convenience of the occupants
of such building or buildings, and upon such terms
and in such manner as the Board of Commissioners
may determine'. Plaintiffs fear that this section does
not serve as a sufficient guide to determine what
shall be done in case the Board of Education abandons
the building when for one reason or another it
becomes no longer useful for their purposes. It
seems to us that the section in question is designed
specifically to cover such a situation. It is true that
administrative problems may arise in the event of
damage by fire or other casualty but those are problems
incident to the management of any building
and it would not be expected that the legislature
would attempt to anticipate and solve in advance
every problem that might be encountered by the
commission. As we observed in Stamos in referring
to Hill v. Relyea, 34 Ill.2d 552, 555, 216
N.E.2d 795, 797: 'There is a distinction between the
delegation of true legislative power and the delegation
to a subordinate of authority to execute the
law. (Citation.) The former involves a discretion as
to what the law shall be; the latter is merely an authority
or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised
under and in pursuance of the law.
(Citations.) It is an established rule that the General
Assembly cannot delegate its general legislative
power to determine what the law shall be. However,
it may delegate to others the authority to do those
things which the legislature might properly do, but
cannot do as understandingly or advantageously.
(Citations.) Absolute criteria whereby every detail
necessary in the enforcement of a law is anticipated
need not be established by the General Assembly.
The constitution merely requires that intelligible
standards be set to guide the agency charged with
enforcement, (citations,) and the precision of the
permissible standard must necessarily vary according
to the nature of the ultimate objective and the
problems involved. (Citations.)' We believe 
that the section in question, when considered in
connection with the other provisions of the act, cannot
be said to involve an unconstitutional delegation
of legislative power. No extended discussion is
required to distinguish this case from Rosemont
Bldg. Supply, Inc. v. Illinois Highway Trust Authority,
45 Ill.2d 243, 258 N.E.2d 569, relied upon
by plaintiffs. The only similarity in the two cases is
that problems of alleged vagueness and indefiniteness
are involved. As remarked above, the 'precision
of the permissible standard must necessarily
vary according to the nature of the ultimate objective
and the problems involved.' In Rosemont the
authority was given its choice between rental to
others or the collection of tolls in the event of non
payment of rentals without specification of any toll
authority or method. This was clearly an unconstitutional

In conclusion, let it be said that this court is fully
aware of the fact that the issues presented in this
case illustrate the classic struggle between those
members of the public who would preserve our
parks and open lands in their pristine purity and
those charged with administrative responsibilities
who, under the pressures of the changing needs of
an increasingly complex society, find it necessary,
in good faith and for the public good, to encroach
to some extent upon lands heretofore considered inviolate
to change. The resolution of this conflict in
any given case is for the legislature and not the
courts. The courts can serve only as an instrument
of determining legislative intent as evidenced by
existing legislation measured against constitutional
limitations. In this process the courts must deal
with legislation as enacted and not with speculative
considerations of legislative wisdom. As previously
indicated in this opinion, existing legislation does
not warrant the restrictive interpretation plaintiffs
would place upon it.

The judgment of the circuit court of Cook County
dismissing plaintiffs' complaint is affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.

In the case of the Children's Museum:
1. CCM would control the use of the area in question.
2. The area would not be devoted to public purposes nor open to the public...without paying a $9 fee.
3. A proposed building with a volume 14 times the existing facility is not small.
4. The public uses of the original area would be eliminated.
5. Their is no convenience to be "afforded those members of the public using the new facility"...again without paying $9.00 at the door.
It should be noted that this 1970 Illinois Supreme Court Decision referred to the Charter Protections of 1861 and 1863 and not the Covenant Protections of 1836 and 1839.
The City of Chicago and the Chicago Park District are now considering "reallocating" a significant portion of Grant Park's Daley Bicentennial Plaza that "is now available for free to the general more restrictive uses or to subject public uses to the self interest of private parties."
The "illegal use" that is referred to in this 1970 decision relates to not allowing the Field Museum to be built where Buckingham Fountain now stands today because of the 1836 and 1839 Dedication Restrictions, not because of the 1861 and 1863 Charter Protections afforded to the owners on Michigan Avenue.
Most Chicago Parks have been dedicated by statute, and the Legislature and governments created by the Legislature can change any "dedication restrictions" according to this 1970 decision.

Grant Park is unique, and the "dedication restrictions" of 1836 and 1839 CANNOT BE CHANGED by the Legislature according to the Illinois Supreme Court decisions of 1897, 1902, 1909, and 1911.
The resolution of the case of the Children's Museum relocating to a site on the protected land of Grant Park is unique because ONLY Grant Park is protected by the "dedication restrictions" of 1836 and 1839 that cannot be changed by the Illinois Legislature or any governmental body created by the Legislature according to the four Ward Decisions of the Illinois Supreme Court in 1897, 1902, 1909, and 1911.
Disclaimer - The 5 Illinois Supreme Court Decisions that are presented on this website were scanned from very poor quality PDF files, then scanned using OCR (Optical Character Recognition) software, and converted to a DOC file for inputing into HTML by the Homestead Software. Because of the historical poor quality of repeated copying, after the OCR conversion, several hundred errors were proofread and corrected. Therefore, there could be minor errors in this presentation. I certify that there are no major errors that would change the interpertation of this decision.
              Richard F. Ward, December, 2007 - Website Administrator
Added 12-20-2007:
This directly applies to the issue of the City of Chicago and/or  the Chicago Park District (both created by the Illinois Legislature) have no right to give the Children's Museum rights which are "contrary to the terms of dedication by the original grantors."

This is the basis of the 3rd Phase of  Covenant Protections. The CCM application cannot be "approved" by the city or park district because citizens can be expected to enforce the 1836 and 1839 dedication restrictions.
Added 12-20-2007:
There was some disagreement in the 2003 Monroe Marina discussions whether the citizen-taxpaying-owners of the East Randolph condominiums adjacent to Grant Park and Monroe Harbor had "STANDING" to enforce the 1836 and 1839 Dedication Covenant Restrictions and the 4 Ward Decisions. And the 2007 Children's Museum discussions have renewed that same question. This 1970 Illinois Supreme Court decision will give all parties guidance that this question is "settled law" in Illinois.
Added 12-20-2007:
There has been no evidence presented that the Chicago Park District is authorized to donate or lease uniquely-protected public park land for a private pay-for-entry commercial children's learning center. CCM calls themselves a "museum" but does not qualify for that designation under the normal defination of the word "museum". It is apparent that the word "museum" was added within the last decade to attract more donations, and now to be elgible for an estimated $1 million annual share of the museum-in-parks real estate tax fund.